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In the 1950's, Congress created a set of budgeting norms which established that
the House of Representatives controlled the power of the purse. Those norms eroded
and were replaced by a free spending Congress which was unable to control its
spending decisions. In 1973, the Congress reformed its budgeting process in an
attempt to correct the problems of the past decade. The 1974 Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act provided for the reconciliation of the second budget
resolution. The reconciliation provision was designed to provide Congress with the
ability to finalize the spending decisions made in the two budget resolutions. In 19S0,
Congress changed the designed intent of the reconciliation provision. Reconciliation
became a tool for the Budget Committees to use in an attempt to control budget
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Reconcilation is the process that enables Congress to enforce the priorities and
totals of a budget resolution. {Ref 1: p. 39} Reconciliation originated with the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Originally, it was
intended to be used after the second concurrent resolution to fmalize the budget. The
second concurrent resolution was designed to be a spending ceiling and reconciliation
would enforce that ceiling.
Reconciliation was hardly used until the FY 1981 budget, when it was moved to
the first concurrent resolution. Congress eliminated the second budget resolution
under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, and made
reconciliation instructions mandatory in the first budget resolution. Section 310 of the
Act states:
Every budget resolution must "to the extent necessary to effectuate the provisions
and requirements of such a resolution" specify the amount by which new budget
authority, budget authority provided in previous years, new entitlements
authority, credit authority, and revenues must be changed. The committees in
both houses must recommend changes in laws within their jurisdiction to
accomplish these required changes. (Ref. 1: p. 40}
In other words, the Budget Committee directs various committees to realize savings or
increase revenue.
This thesis will focus on Congress and the power of the purse. In order to
understand the impact of the reconciliation, it is important to trace the congressional
budget process beginning in the 1950's. In the fifties, Congress wielded the power of
the purse under the constitutional provision which states that "no money shall be
drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law" (Ref. 2: p.
xiii}. Congress used the appropriations process to control the budget. The
appropriation committees had jurisdiction over a large portion of the budget. Over
70% of the budget came under the committees's review. A unit - subunit relationship
existed between the appropriation committees and Congress, held together by norms
and roles, that allowed each to function effectively. It was an uneasy relationship at
best. Representatives must be reelected periodically, and sometimes they sponsor pet
projects which are good for their district. These projects were forced to pass under the
scrutiny of the Appropriation Committee. Congressmen wanted their projects to be
funded, but yielded to the Appropriation Committee's spending cuts because they
accepted the fact that the committees were protecting the purse.
It was during this period that Wildavsky, in his book "The Politics of the Budget
Process", described the budget as incremental:
The largest determining factor about the size and content of this year's budget is
last year's budget. Most of the budget is a product of previous decisions. . . .
The budget may be conceived of as an iceberg with by far the largest portion
below the surface outside the control of anyone. Many items in the budget are
standard and are simply reenacted every year unless there is a special reason to
challenge them. {Ref. 3: p. 13}
Incrementalism worked fine during the periods of economic growth that
characterized America during the 1950's and the early 1960's. A slight increase in the
budget was supported by a growth in the gross national product. The size of the
budget increased without the use of large amounts of deficit spending. A growing
economy and the appropriations process allowed the representatives in Congress to put
policy before individual concerns.
The budget process deteriorated during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. The
Vietnam War, the Great Society, and a sluggish economy strained Congress's ability to
control the budget. In the years before the budget act, Congress circumvented the
appropriations process and put individual concerns before national priorities. Congress
used backdoor spending and other strategies to keep increased spending off budget.
There was a breakdown in the long established relationship between Congress and its
subunit, the Appropriation Committee. Congressmen began to act independently and
did not accept old party or procedural rules. A simple legislative inhibition against
"writing" legislation on the floor would not deter a Congress determined to generously
endow its favorite programs over the objections of the Appropriations Committee {Ref.
4: p. 437}. Congress was not the only problem; changes to the Appropriations
Committees were causing them to accommodate increased spending desires.
Congress self-imposed five spending ceilings from 1967 to 1972. The ceilings
were added to four different legislative instruments which demonstrated a lack of
congressional procedures for the consideration of spending limitations {Ref. 4: p. 42}.
The ceilings only dealt with spending that went though the normal appropriations
process, although some of the spending that did go through the Appropriation
Committees was given "ofT-budget" status to prevent it from bring cut. However, the
ceilings failed and Congress was unable to control spending which was in the form of
entitlements and authorizations.
President Nixon impounded funds and cancelled programs to assume the power
of the purse from Congress. The relationship between the executive and legislative
branches reached an all time low. The problems between the two branches took on an
air of a constitutional crisis {Ref. 5: p. 119}. Congress reacted and organized a joint
committee to study improving the budget process. The Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act emerged from these troubled times.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act gave Congress a set of
procedures and institutions to deal more comprehensively with the national budget
{Ref. 6: p. 322}. The Act was the legislatures's response to the President's increased
power over the budget process. The Congress hoped these procedures would reaffirm
their control over the purse as written in the constitution. The Act created Budget
Committees to oversee two budget resolutions. The budgets were to be comprehensive
documents which tied together the following items:
(1) budget authority and outlays;
(2) authority and outlays for each functional category;
(3) total revenues;
(4) level of surplus or deficit; and
(5) public debt. (Ref. 4: p. 14}
The idea of Budget Committees is not new; Wildavsky had identified Budget
Committees as "typical reform" in 1964. He said:
If the proposed Budget Committees were unable to secure the passage of its
recommendations, as it would surely be, it would have gone to enormous trouble
without accomplishing anything but a public revelation of futility. {Ref. 3: p. 13}
Other reforms of the new Budget Act included: strict timetables, the control of
impoundments, and bringing backdoor spending under the appropriations process.
{Ref. 4: p. 24}
The opposition to the Budget Committees, the new guardians of the purse, were
the Appropriations Committees, who managed to restrict their power during the
drafting of the Act. From 1977 to 1980, The Budget Committees attempted to save
money by assuming savings in the first budget resolution. These assumptions were
known as "legislative savings". A House Budget Committee's Task Force on Budget
Process report explained the link between legislative savings and reconciliation:
Reconciliation can be traced back to the first budget resolutions, during Fy 1977
- 80, which assumed legislative savings as part of their overall budget targets.
Legislative savings is a reduction in budget authority and outlays which is
achieved by enacting changes in current law mandating spending (i.e.,
entitlements and other similar spending.). This differs from appropriations which
are yearly changes in dollar levels. {Ref 7: p. 1}
The Budget Committees were powerless to enforce their assumed savings. The other
committees ignored the targets, resulting in no budget savings or congressional control
of increased spending.
Congress now had a process that dealt with the whole budget and not just pieces
of it, but that was not enough. In the next few years Congress discovered that it was
easier to reform the budget process than it was to make fiscal policy and establish
national priorities {Ref 4: p. 55}. Other areas of the budget were also in trouble.
Allen Schick wrote an assessment of the budget process in his book "Congress and
Money" during the five year period after its inception:
The Budget process has not triggered a fresh examination of national
priorities. In fact, Congress did more reordering of budget priorities when it
lacked a budget process than it did in the five years after it had one. During the
1972 -1975 period, there was a massive shift in the relative shares of national
defense and income security, the largest categories in the budget. Defense lost its
lead as the biggest function and dropped from about one-half to one-quarter of
total outlays. Income security took over first place, growing to fully one-third of
the budget and accounting for almost one-half of total outlay increase in the
1972 - 1975 years. (Ref 8: p. 25}
By 1981, one heard echoes of the early 1970's, warnings of presidential
usurpation of the power of the purse {Ref. 6: p. 323}. Leon Panetta (D-Cal), one of
the key architects of the House Democrats' reconciliation bill, appealed to members of
the House:
I ask my colleagues . . . that we not surrender the only power we have here, the
power to check and balance the Executive. That line has to be drawn
somewhere, and I urge my colleagues to draw it now. (Ref. 6: p. 324}
In 1980, Congress used reconciliation to regain control of the budget. The
Budget Committees moved reconcilation to the first budget resolution and established
their willingness to control the budget. The committee stated:
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The Budget Act contemplated that it might be necessary to implement an
extraordinary procedure, known as reconciliation, in order to implement the
policies implicit in the budget resolution. Under the framework set forth in
section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act, the reconciliation process would be
implemented in the second budget resolution for a given fiscal year. However,
due to the necessity of acting quickly and effectively to balance the budget and
realize that there may not be time to act on reconciliation instructions before the
end of the Second Session of the 96th Congress, the Committee has included
reconciliation instructions in the first budget resolution. Section 301(b)(2) of the
Budget Act provides the authority for this action. This section provides that the
first budget resolution may require any procedure "which is considered
appropriate to carry out the purpose of this Act". {Ref. 7: p. 17}
Some Committee Chairmen questioned the constitutionality of the move. Morris
Udall and 15 other Committee Chairmen opposed the move and said during debate:
This is an attack on the budget process, but more than that, it is an attack on
the committee system. There are, in my opinion, no compelling reasons for
creating a precedent for invoking reconciliation in the first budget resolution.
There are all kinds of good reasons for not disrupting the budget process this
year. Once permitted, reconciliation in the first resolution would become a
matter of routine and regular procedure. Hereafter, the first resolution would set
ceilings, not targets, and the Congress would be controlled by one budget
resolution adopted early in the year. Many weeks before relevant hearings could
be held on which rational decisions could be based, Irrevocable ceilings would be
established with which all spending bills would have to conform. (Ref. 7: p. 19)
Despite the opposition of many of the leaders of Congress, the motion moving
reconciliation to the first resolution passed. The first use of reconcilation proved an
overwhelming success. The Budget Committees directed various authorizing and
appropriation committees to save billions of dollars. Since that time, the reconcilation
process has been used to achieve mixed results.
B. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used for this thesis was to research literature dating back to the
1950's and follow a critical analysis of the budget process to the present. In order to
gather data for the analysis section, copies of the House and Senate budget resolutions
and bills were obtained. The savings information and totals in Public Laws 93-344,
96-499, 97-35, and 98-270 were also used for data collection and analysis. The data
collected for reconciliation focused on the fiscal years 1981 to 1986. Within that time
period overall macro totals and individual decision points were collected.
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This thesis will examine the perceptions and facts of reconciliation, and address
the following questions: why are the reconciliation instructions followed, when a
similar budget process was ignored for years? Are the committees actually following
the instructions or do they change the law to suit their needs? Finally, did the House
use reconciliation to regain the power of the purse, or does that power rest with
another group?
C. ORGANIZATION
In order to understand the roots of reconciliation, Chapter II traces the power of
the purse from the 1950's through to the need for budgeting change. Chapter III
explains the 1974 Budget Act and outlines the changes in committee structure. The
failure of legislative savings will also be explored. Chapter IV gives a description of
the first use of reconciliation and explains the rules and scope of the process. FY 1981
was a model year for the process: This chapter also examines the years in which
reconciliation did not work, as well or at all. In Chapter V, the data is presented and
analyzed. The focus of the analysis explores some perceptions that have developed
about the use of reconciliation: specifically, whether the Congress actually sticks to the
targets of the budget resolution. The data is also analyzed for any other significant
trends. The final chapter draws conclusions about the process and outcomes of
Congress's use of reconciliation.
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II. THE BUDGET PROCESS BEFORE 1974
In order to understand the reconciliation process, it is important to review the
events that led to its inclusion in the 1974 budget act. This chapter will outline the
budget process as it was during the 1950's and trace the changes that occured during
the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. How Congress economized during this time
period will also be studied.
A. AiN OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS
The budget process of the 1950's seemed to be a budget system that worked.
There were relationships and norms that held the process together and provided an
annual budget with authorized and appropriated acts. That process was an outgrowth
of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The following were the three distinct
phases of the process:
(1) Presidential Budget Submission
(2) Congressional Authorization
(3) Congressional Appropriation
A brief explanation of each of these phases will be given below.
1. Presidential Budget Submission
The President submitted his budget during the third week of January. The
President's budget is a single package which ties together the various executive
agencies' requests for program. In 1921, The Budget and Accounting Act created a
Bureau of the Budget to help the President organize the various executive branch
requests. The Bureau of the Budget gave the President the necessary tools to bring
harmony to the money requests of these agencies. (Ref. 9: p. 18}
In order to submit his budget on time, the President's work on that year's
budget began 18 months earlier when various agencies representatives started
discussions with bureau experts about program for the new fiscal year and the
problems of integrating such programs with prior years {Ref. 9: p. 19}. After all of the
program requests were submitted, the bureau balanced the various requests with the
president's plans and goals for that year's agenda. During December, the Bureau of
the Budget and the President made their last decisions about the programs and
finalized the budget request. After the budget was submitted, Congress had until 1 July
to complete the authorizations and appropriations process.
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2. Authorization
Authorization is when Congress approves the functions for which expenditures
are to be made. That is, the Congress passes legislation authorizing specific activities,
such as foreign aid and defense, but does not fund and sometimes does not even specify
the amount of funds implied in the activity. {Ref. 10: p. 34}
There are various ways that Congress can set forth which agencies can spend
money. The most common method of spending authority is the annual appropriation.
This places the commitment for funding programs into the appropriation review
process annually. There are nine other ways that Congress authorizes spending
authority:
(1) Ordinary current appropriations, including one year, multiple-year and no year
appropriations.
(2) Annual indefinite appropriations.
(3) Permanent appropriations: definite and indefinite.
(4) Contract authorizations which confer authority to enter into contracts and
other obligations in advance of an appropriation: current and permanent.
(5) Appropriations to liquidate contract authorizations.
(6) Authorizations to expend from public debt receipts.
(7) Authorizations to make loans out of the treasury.
(8) Reappropriations.
(9) Reauthorizations of contract authority.
(10) Reauthorizations to expend from public receipts. {Ref. 9: p. 21}
Each method has been developed by Congress for a specific purpose. Some methods
avoid the annual appropriations review, while others give money to programs directly
from the Treasury and keep the money off budget. The "re" categories,
reappropriations and reauthorizations, can be used by Congress as a method of
grabbing the bookkeeping credit for savings made by the executive agencies either by
economic operation or because of conditions making it impossible for the agency to
commit all of the amounts authorized. {Ref. 9: p. 23}
In summary, the Authorizing Committees established the laws that specify-
how much money should be given to a program and what method of spending
authority will be used. The authorization process creates a legal claim against which
the Government is obligates to pay.
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3. Appropriation
Appropriation legislation permits a government agency or department to
commit or obligate the Government to certain expenditures, or what is commonly
called "new obligational authority". {Ref. 10: p. 34}
Before 1974, the Appropriations Committees operated in closed sessions and
did the vast majority of the work for Congress on the budget. By 1950, the process
had evolved into a well established structure for decision-making. There were three
levels to the structure: Congress as a whole, the Appropriations Committees, and the
Appropriations Subcommittees. At the lowest level, the Appropriations
Subcommittees held hearings at which interested parties (including cabinet members
and budget officials, as well as private citizens) could make statements and answer
questions of members of the subcommittees concerned {Ref. 9: p. 23}. The
Subcommittees specialized giving them expertise. The Appropriation Committee
gathered all of the specialized knowledge from its subunits and finalized the
information into bills. The bills were presented to their respective House and were
either approved or rejected. If the bill passed it went to conference; otherwise, the
committee had to make changes and once again put it to a floor vote.
The House and the Senate Appropriations Committees met to resolve their
differences in conference and then presented a unified front when the final versions of
the appropriations bills were put to vote on the floor. After Congress passed the bills,
the final step was to submit the appropriations bills for Presidential signature. During
the 1950's, the Appropriations Committees had power and actively tried to reduce all
of the President's requests. The Appropriations Committees truely were the guardians
of the purse.
B. THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE SYSTEM
Appropriation politics in Congress was an effective tool to control the budget
until the Congress weakened established budgeting patterns during the 1960's. This
section will describe how the Appropriations Committees held the power of the purse.
It was Richard F. Fenno, Jr who wrote the definitive study of Appropriations
politics in Congress called "The Power of the Purse". Fenno described the
Appropriation Committees as a subset of the House of Representatives that was given
vast power, but was held in check by a set of expectations and sanctions designed to
allow it to function. There were four goals that Congress expected the Appropriations
Committees to meet:
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(1) To deliberate, decide and make recommendations which will then be acted
upon authoritatively by the House.
(2) Make educated recommendations as to the amount of money to be
appropriated for the various operations of the Government.
(3) Oversee the executive branch exercising a continuous watchfulness over the
administration.
(4) Negotiate with the other House to iron out differences in the bills. {Ref. 2: p.
It was the House's Appropriations Committee that was the real guardian of the
purse. The House Appropriations Committee members viewed the Senate as the
"upper body" because it always "ups" appropriations {Ref. 2: p. 100}. Because of
different norms and values the Senate became known as " The court of last appeal".
Because of the guardian role of the House Appropriation Committee, most of this
paper will deal with that committee.
The committee was able to reduce the President's request for programs because
the members maintained the following goals for themselves:
(1) That the power of the purse is the essential bulwark of congressional power.
(2) That the money in the Federal Treasury cannot be made available for
government use except by act of Congress, and should be granted by annual
appropriation.
(3) Budget estimates should be reduced.
(4) That member constituencies interests should be served. (Backdoor spending
reflects the committees failure to meet this goal){Ref. 2: pp. 10-19}
The committee defended their power through the 1950's and into the 1960's. The
goals of the committee blended with what Congress expected from its subunit.
The Appropriations Committees used a variety of strategies to maintain their
autonomy and influence. The first strategy was to maintain the scope of the
appropriations process. The Appropriations Committee was expected to balance what
the Congress wanted; for example, a new program and what was just enough funding
for the program to function. Fenno explained about that balance:
Between these extremes, conflict will arise over what constitutes "adequate" or
"sufficient" financing and what constitutes the "survival" of a given program at a
particular time. Hence, House expectations as to the committee's area of
discretion are hard to pinpoint. One can only generalize that when a majority
has declared support for a program, the Appropriations Committee is expected to
appropriate most of the money authorized or requested for it. A vastly larger
portion of a request is expected to be beyond the reach of the Appropriation
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Committee than is expected to lie within its area of discretion. The committee's
independent influence is expected to be marginal or incremental. Such is the
dominant demand of every authorization statute. (Ref. 2: pp. 7-8}
The Appropriation Committee maintained their influence by trying to prevent
backdoor spending. Clarence Cannon, who was chairman from 1949 to 52 and 55 to
1964, was a domineering chairman who tried to thrust his conservative views on the
committee and vigorously guarded appropriations against raids on its jurisdiction [Ref.
8: p. 418} During his tenure, the committee maintained its influence.
The second strategy was to shield themselves from spending pressures. House
Appropriations Committee members were carefully selected from relatively "safe"
districts. Because their reelection prospects were favorable, these members could afford
to resist pressure from interest groups (Ref. 8: p. 428}. This time honored selection
process insured that members of the committee would be able to adjust to a rigid set of
norms that they imposed upon themselves. The chairman was also selected from the
committee after years of budget cutting indoctrination.
Another way to shield themselves was to use closed or executive sessions. The
committee used executive sessions to protect deliberations from pressure generated
through publicity which, in their view, increased appropriations and prevented them
from protecting the treasury. (Ref. 2: p. 113}
The last strategy was to select conservative members. This caused the
composition of the committee to be made up of conservative members of both parties
who expected each other to work hard and make budget cuts. The conservative
members shared the same goals and could see beyond party lines.
In summary, the Congress expected the Appropriations Committee to fund
programs and watch over the purse strings. The committee managed to do this until
the mid 60's using domineering leadership and a few anti-spending strategies. While
the House's Appropriations Committee guarded the purse, the Senate's Committee
maintained different goals and balanced the cuts. This system had worked for 80 years,
but it was about to undergo debilitating changes.
C. ECONOMIZING
While there were great pressures on the Appropriations Committee to increase
spending, what happened during the years Congress was in an economy mood? How
did Congress impose its will on the Appropriations Committee? This section explores
how the Congress economized from 1950 to 1965.
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Fenno studied various years during the 50's and 60's, and two years in particular
in which an economy mood pervaded. The way Congress imposed its will on the
Appropriation Committee was to reject the appropriations bills when they reached the
floor. Each of the fourteen bills generally arrived for a vote at different times. In
1951, the Treasury - Post Office Bill arrived on the floor first. Fenno explained how
Congress dealt with that bill:
Minority Whip Leslie Arends rose immediately, urged all Republicans to be
present to vote for the "economy amendments" that were to come, and delivered
the following invocation for proceedings. "May this be the beginning of a great
economy drive. May we have a good attendance when each appropriation bill
comes up and may we have votes for economy." The leader of the Southern
Democrats, Representative Eugene Cox, intoned in reply, "The importance of
what we are doing here this afternoon is that it should help the bureaucrats
downtown to realize that the honeymoon of the order is over, and that the day of
the fuzzy-minded, do-gooder is over. . . ."
The fact that a united subcommittee backed by the party leadership acting in
one of the least controversial program area (treasury) could not prevail against
the economy mood in "the House", suggests the decisiveness of the mood
variable when it is operative. {Ref. 2: p. 472
It was this pattern that informed the Appropriations Committee that it was an
economy year in the Congress. In 1951, the mood was caused by increased defense
spending for the Korean War. In order for this system to work, appropriation bills had
to reach the floor in a timely manner for debate. The fiscal year started 1 July.
Lawmakers complained at the time that the budget process was too short and required
revision. Still that time period was characterized by budgets completed on time. In
1957, an economy mood was domestically induced. President Eisenhower sent
Congress the largest peacetime budget to that date {Ref. 2: p. 478}. The budget sent
shock waves through the Congress. Again the Congress informed the Appropriations
Committee that it wanted increased reductions by defeating bills and calling for
increased cuts. The Appropriations Committees only defense at these times was the
roll-call vote. The roll-call is a weak defense but sometimes effective when a
Congressman does not want to be recorded as voting against a certain program.
The floor vote renews the unit-subunit relationship between the House and
Appropriation Committees. Fenno points out that the committee's bills generally pass
because of four reasons:
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In the first place, the committee can manipulate the floor context to its
advantage by controlling the flow of its bills to the floor, by restricting the spread
of information, by minimizing the influence of party leaders, and by dominating
floor participation.
In the second place the committee operates under favorable conditio ns in
the Committee of the Whole House. The rules making provision for a quorum
and those specifying amending and voting procedures bestow advantages on the
committee. The committee also benefits from the inability and the unwillingness
of the House members to devote their scarce resources of time, energy and
legislative credit to a consistent or concentrated or conflict producing
consideration of appropriations legislation.
In the third place, the committee commands a substantial measure of respect
and confidence among House members
Finally and most important, the committee succeeds on the House floor
because it usually maintains a high degree of unity. {Ref. 2: p. 500}
In conclusion, the floor vote is where the House as a whole can express its mood
to the Appropriation Committee. In most years there is a spending bias that the
Appropriation Committees must protect themselves from. However, there are
exceptional years when the Appropriation Committees become the spenders trying to
protect programs against more cuts.
D. CHANGES DURING 1966 TO 1973
It was during the Johnson and Nixon presidencies that great changes took place
in the budgeting arena. These changes led to the call for reform. There were many
reasons for the changes during these years; some environmental factors include: the
Vietnam war, Watergate, and social and economic unrest. President Johnson believed
that a country as great as America could afford "guns and butter". All of these
changes come under four general headings:
(1) Fighting over budgets.
(2) Appropriations versus Tax Committees: fighting over ceilings.
(3) President versus Congress: fighting over spending priorities.
(4) Weaking of the Appropriations Committee. {Ref 8: p. 15}
Each of these areas will be analyzed.
1 . Fighting over budgets
The conflict in the budgeting arena grew during the Johnson presidency and
climaxed during the Nixon presidency. There were two reasons for the fighting over
budgets:
(1) Increased participation in budget policy. {Ref. 8: p. 20}
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(2) The lost increment. {Ref. 8: p. 23}
a. Increased Participation
Before the 1970's, the budget process was closed to outside scrutiny by its
inherent complexity, the obscurantism of budget documents, the impenetrability of the
tax laws, and the failure of affected interests to invest in budget research and data {Ref.
8: p. 21}. The flow of the budget process was kept out of the hands of most
Congressmen until the floor vote. For years, the Appropriation Committees and Ways
and Means Committees protected their power by keeping Congress ignorant (Ref. 8: p.
21}. During these years, Congressmen began to redefine their roles as representatives.
In a democracy, Congressmen must satisfy their voters in order to be elected
periodically. This brings the role of representative in conflict with the role of policy
maker {Ref. 4: p. 10}. In order to satisfy their constituents, representatives felt the
need to find different ways to circumvent the normal appropriation process. The
Authorizing Committees began to make more of the budget uncontrollable. From
1967 to 1974, the percentage of uncontrollable budget rose from 59.1% to 72.2%.
Even more interesting is that during this period, more than 90 percent of the increase
in total outlay was accounted for by uncontrollable spending. {Ref. 8: p. 27}
Congressmen began demanding information and breaking down existing
barriers to obtaining it. As the participation of representatives increased, so did
conflict. But it was not just Congressmen who wanted more participation; numerous
interest organizations began to issue their own budget studies each year. Shortly after
the President's budget went to Congress, Mayors, Governors, County Officials, and
many interest groups released analyses of what the budget meant for their governments
or their clients (Ref. 8: p. 22}. Increased participation slowed the process by increasing
the interest focused on every cut.
The second reason there was increased fighting over budgets was because
resources became scarce. In 1966, President Johnson had asserted:
Both of these commitments involve great costs (military and domestic needs).
They are costs we can and will meet. . . . The struggle in Vietnam must be
supported. The advance toward a Great Society at home must continue
unabated. {Ref. 8: p. 25}
In 1967, he proposed both deficit spending and a tax surcharge:
This program will require a measure of sacrifice as well as continued work and
resourcefulness. . . . This budget represents a careful balance of our abundant
resources and our awesome responsibilities. {Ref. 8: p. 26}
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The conflict grew during the Nixon presidency because of two reasons: (1).
the economy stagfiated, which hurt the GNP; and (2). the executive branch proposed
radical departures from incrementalism, which hurt the way the President and Congress
normally do business. During various budget years, President Nixon recommended
hundreds of program terminations, almost all of which the President proposed to
implement without prior legislative approval {Ref. 8:p. 29). This attack at the base of
the budget caused intense budget conflict. With the economy in trouble, the rosy
picture of the early 60's had disappeared.
2. Appropriations versus Tax committees
The next great change was the blurring of the responsibilities for control of
spending. As more of the budget became uncontrollable, the Tax Committees gained
more control over spending. Most entitlements (such as Social Security, public
assistance, Medicare and Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income) were under the
jurisdiction of the Ways and Means and Finance Committees {Ref. 8: p. 29}. During
those years, there was no way to assess the impact of budget decisions because
spending control was so fragmented. The Appropriation blamed the Tax Committees
and the Tax blamed the Appropriation Committees. This situation led to the
imposition of spending ceilings. On five occasions between 1967 and 1973, Congress
acted on proposals to limit total federal spending. {Ref. 8: p. 32}
The problem with the spending ceilings was that they didn't work. Many of
the ceilings were broken because of uncontrollable spending and Congressional action.
Spending ceilings were an untried reform that tends to increase the level of conflict.
Wildavsky points out that spending ceilings cause government officals, who have every
incentive to raise their spending income while reducing their internal differences, to
increase the conflict level in government {Ref. 11: p. 32}. This fighting between the
committees and Congress's reluctance to deal with unpopular legislation led to five
years of broken ceilings.
3. President versus Congress
There has always been a difference between what the President wants for the
Nation and what Congress feels are the correct priorities. This conflict between the
President and Congress reached unworkable levels during the Nixon Presidency. In his
book, "The Imperial Presidency", Arthur Schlesiger argues that the Nixon Presidency
was marked by a breakdown of Comity between the President and Congress. The
concept of Comity is vague, but it is meant to connote a degree of restraint in
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interbranch relations that allows informal norms to keep disputes from getting out of
hand {Ref. 5: p. 115}. The conflict broke down into two categories: (1) the President's
use of Veto's and impoundments, and (2) general conflict in the budgetary arena. Each
of these areas will be analyzed.
a. The President's Use of Veto's and Impoundments.
A pocket veto is an unsigned bill that does not become law if there is an
adjournment. The Constitution provides that "If any bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,
the Same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
their adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall not be a law." President
Nixon used the pocket veto, during a five day Christmas recess, to avoid an almost
certain override. Senator Edward Kennedy went to Court to challenge this
unprecedented use of the pocket veto (Ref. 5: p. 116}. Although this was not a major
incident, it illustrates what Congress perceived to be a breach of Comity, or traditional
norms.
The Congress gave up on spending ceilings in 1972, and President Nixon
looked for another way to control spending. The President used the impoundment to
rewrite national policy. Rather than the deferment of expenses, Nixon's aim was the
cancellation of unwanted programs (Ref. 8: p. 46}. Allen Schick in his book "Congress
and Money" explains why impoundments were such a problem:
Impoundments exacerbated Nixon's relationship with Congress. First,
impoundment was a unilateral action, taken without any involvement of
Congress whatsoever. When Nixon impounded for policy reasons, he in effect
told Congress, "I don't care what you appropriate; I will decide what will be
spent." Second, impoundment offered no clear procedure for resolving budgetary
impasses between the two branches. If Congress overrides a presidential veto, its
budget priorities prevail; if it cannot muster a two thirds vote, the president's
priorities win. Impoundments, by contrast, invited stalemate and protracted
conflict. (Ref 8: p. 48}
b. The Budgetary Arena
During the Nixon Presidency, budget disputes got out of hand. The
President turned the budget into one of the major campaign issues of 1972 and caused
warfare over the budget to escalate sharply {Ref. 8: p. 43}. During the next two years,
Congress and the President fought for control of spending priorities. In the Fall of
1972, Congress passed H.R. 16810 which created a Joint Study Committee to study
22
budgetary reform (Ref. 5: p. 124}. This study was to eventually lead to the 1974
Budget Act. It is not clear whether the conflict between Nixon and the Congress
would have led to the passage of the Budget Act or whether it took an event like
Watergate to weaken the President and allow its passage. But in any case the stage was
set for a new budget process.
4. Weakening of the Appropriations Committee
One of the biggest changes that occured was the weakening of the
Appropriation Committees. Fenno's picture of the strong Appropriation Committee
who held the power of the purse had changed. There were three changes that
weakened the appropriation committees and, therefore, the appropriation process:
a Limiting the scope of the appropriations process.
b Exposing the Appropriations Committees to spending pressures.
c Changing of the membership of the House Appropriation Committee. {Ref. 8:
p. 425}
Each of these changes will be explored.
a. Limiting the Scope of the Appropriations Process
As Congress increased the use of backdoor spending and entitlements, the
scope of the appropriation process was reduced. By FY 1974, only 44% of the budget
was associated with the items to be considered in the appropriations bills.
Appropriations Committee control decreased not by chance but as a result of a
deliberate effort by Congress to unshackle itself from its fiscal guardians {Ref. 8: p.
425}. Congress no longer controlled the budget because it had authorized too much of
the budget away. The Legislative Committees began to rail against their opposite
numbers on the appropriations side for exercising more power with less information,
usually on the grounds that expenditures should be greater than they are, even if that
meant getting around the annual appropriations process through direct (backdoor
spending) or indirect (tax subsidies) access to the Treasury. {Ref. 3: p. 214}
b. Exposing Appropriations to Spending Pressures.
As discussed previously, the Appropriation Committee tried to protect
themselves from spending pressures. During this time period, the Congress changed
many of the protective strategies of the Appropriation Committee. The changes were
allowed because of the weak chairmanship of George Mahon. It was Clarence Cannon
who had defended the appropriations process with vigor during the 1950s and early
60's. George Mahon, on the other, hand was conciliatory and accommodating during
his 15 year term as chairman which ended with his retirement in 1978. {Ref. 8: p. 418}
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The first of these changes was the open meeting. Congress always wanted
the Appropriations Committee's meetings open. The closed or executive meeting had
allowed the committee to protect themselves from spending pressure generated by
publicity. Every one of the more than 700 meetings of the House Appropriation
Committee in the 91st Congress (1969 - 70) was closed; the Senate Committee closed
about three - quarters of its meetings. Then, in a rapid series of moves, the House and
Senate chipped away at the rules permitting or mandating closed sessions {Ref. 8: p.
429). The chilling effect of an open meeting on opposition to spending proposals was
described by a subcommittee clerk who clearly was not happy about the results:
The House Appropriations Committee is weaker now. The members seem to be
playing to the audience. They are not prone in an open markup or conference to
say what they want to say. This year we had five or six members who showed up
at our conference and some of the projects they wanted were dogs. But members
are not likely to criticize and hurt another member's feelings, so you don't have
the kind of exchange we used to have when markups and conferences were
closed. {Ref 8: p. 427}
The Appropriations Committee used to protect itself by selecting the Committee and
Subcommittee Chairmen from among themselves. During the 70's it was the
Democratic Caucus and later the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee that
selected Committee Chairmen. This broke the long tradition of the Chairman being
schooled with the cost cutting norms and values of the Appropriation Committee. The
Chairmen played to the audience and satisfied the caucus in order to maintain the chair
(Ref. 8: p. 430). Now open to spending pressures, the Appropriation Committee lost
its budget cutting edge.
c. The Changing Membership.
From 1966 to 1974, the number of liberals increased on the Appropriations
Committees. Many were added to the committee because the Democratic Caucus
decided key committees should have at least a 2 to 1 party ratio. {Ref. 8: p. 434}.
These new members were not schooled by the normal process and, therefore, added to
the changing of the norms.
The three changes caused the Appropriation Committee to evolve into a
more liberal group, who were playing to the audience and were dealing with much
smaller chunks of the budget. This combination of changes weakened the
Appropriation Committees and subdued them as guardians of the purse. The next
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chapter will examine the Budget Act of 1974 and how Congress created new guardians
of the purse.
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III. THE 1974 BUDGET ACT: FROM 1974 TO 1980
This chapter will examine Public Law 93-344 and its impact on congressional
budgeting from 1974 to 1979. The object of this chapter is to explain the new budget
process and explore its performance during the five year period before reconciliation.
The previous chapter outlined how Congress was able to economize by rejecting
appropriations bills as they reached the floor. Under the new system, it became the
Budget Committees's responsibility to economize. Before they used reconciliation in
1980, the Budget Committee attempted to control the purse strings with legislative
savings. The Budget Committees were hampered in their efforts because they were the
new committees in the already established congressional committee system.
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of the Budget Act. The second
section will explore the creation of the Budget Committees and their new role as
guardians of the purse. Finally, the last section will explain the failure of legislative
savings.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE BUDGET ACT
Because of the conflict of the late 60's and early 70's, Congress decided a new-
budget process was needed. On 27 October 1972, Congress established the Joint Study
Committee to examine the possibility of reform. Table 1 summarizes the legislative
history of the Budget Act, Public Law 93-344, which began with the JSC's reports and
ended with the President signing the bill into law {Ref. 8: p. 54}.
1 . The Joint Study Committee on Budget Reform
Liberals, conservatives, and reformers called for reform of the budget process.
Not since the budget reform of 1921 had such a coalition of Congressmen been
gathered in the name of budget reform. The desire to study the alternatives led to the
formation of a study group composed of both houses. The membership of the
committee was drawn primarily from the Appropriations and Revenue Committees (28
of the 32 members) {Ref. 5: p. 132}. As a result, the initial proposals of the committee
were specific to the spending and revenue areas. Congress changed many of the
proposals but left the overall scheme of the reform intact. The proposed plan would
layer reforms over the existing system. The committee's proposals would allow the
committees of Congress to maintain their current jurisdiction {Ref. 5: p. 132}. It was
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TABLE 1






Joint Study Committee (JSC) established.
18 Apr 1973 JSC report issued.
11 Apr 1973 S. 1541 introduced (Senate's version of
the new budget process).
17 Apr 1973 S. 373 reported (impoundment control).
10 May 1973 Senate passed S. 373
27 Jun 1973 H. R. 8480 reported (House's version of
impoundment control).
25 Jul 1973 House passed H. R. 8480.
20 Nov 1973 H. R. 7130 reported (House's version of
the new budget process).
28 Nov 1973 S. 1541 reported.
05 Dec 1973 House passed H. R. 7130.
22 Mar 1974 Senate passed S. 1541.
12 Jun 1974 Conference Committee reported.
18 Jun 1974 House adopted conference report.
21 Jun 1974 Senate adopted conference report.
12 Jul 1974 President signed Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act:
Public Law 93-344.
clear the Joint Study Committee (JSC) version of the new budget process was loaded in
favor of those who wanted less federal spending and smaller budget deficits. In view of
the background of budget reform and the composition the JSC, this preference was to
be expected. (Ref. 8: p. 72}
The JSC proposed that Budget Committees be created to oversee the budget
process. The membership of the committees were to be equally drawn from the
Appropriations Committee, Revenue Committees, and Congress as a whole. The
Budget Committees would report concurrent resolutions at the beginning of the budget
cycle. This proposal was unaminously endorsed by the JSC even though it encrouched
upon the Appropriations Committees discretionary budgeting ability {Ref. 5: p. 132}.
Other reform proposals included: the limitation of backdoor spending, bolstering the
control of the Appropriations Committees over floor action, and the use of overall
levels of revenue, debt, and deficit to control spending.
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2. Public Law 93-344: Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
Congress studied the JSC's recommendations and began to chip away at the
strong pro committee proposals. During the consideration process, Congress changed
the proposals to allow for greater spending input from the floor. However, the
principles underlying the proposals were generally accepted. No legislative interest got
all that it wanted from the Congressional Budget Act; nor was any interest completely
thwarted {Ref. 8: p. 71).
The new budget law created the following reforms:
a. A Congressional Budget Office to provide budgetary data
b. Backdoor spending would be brought under the appropriations process.
c. A strict timetable was established.
d. Impoundments were controlled.
e. Two budget resolutions would set targets and ceilings on spending.
f. Budget Committees were established.
With the exception of the Budget Committees, each one of the reforms will be given an
overview. The Budget Committees will be examined in the next section.
a. C.B.O.
Title II of Public Law 93-344 established the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). The CBO was given a specific mandate to assist both the House and Senate
Budget Committees and serve as a principle source of information on the budget and
on taxing and spending legislation {Ref. 7: p. 7}. One of the CBO's more important
functions was the scorekeeping and tracking of Congress's numerous spending
decisions. Scorekeeping was envisioned as a way to maintain the targets of the first
resolution. In addition to its scorekeeping role, the CBO gives its version of the
economic forecasts to the Budget Committees to be used in the preparation for the
markup of the first budget resolution. The report discusses alternative budget levels, in
the aggregate as well as for each major functional category of the budget. {Ref. 7: p. 8}
b. Backdoor Spending
Section 401 of the Budget Act provides controls over three forms of
backdoor spending: entitlement, contract authority, and borrowing authority. The
object of this section was to stop any new contract or borrowing authority by putting
that kind of legislation under appropriations review.
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c. Timetable
Title III, Sec 300 of the Act includes a timetable for various phases of the
congressional budget process, precribing the actions to take place at each point. Table





















President submits his budget.
Committees and joint committees
submit reports to Budget
Committees.
Budget Committees report first
concurrent resolution on the
budget to their houses.
Committees report bills and
resolutions authorizing new
budget authority.
Congress completes action on
first concurrent resolution
resolution on the budget.
Congress completes action on
bills and resolutions providing
new budget authority and new
spending authority.
Congress completes action
on second required concurrent
resolution on the budget.
Congress completes action on
reconciliation bill or resolution
Fiscal year begins.
The timetable can be simplified into four phases:
(1) Information gathering, analysis, and report on first concurrent resolution
(January 15 - April 15).
(2) Adoption of first resolution: establishment of targets (April 15 - May 15).
(3) Enactment of appropriations bills (May 15 - September 14).
(4) Adoption of second concurrent resolution and reconciliation (September 15 -
October I). {Ref. 4: p. 26}
The timetable formalized and structured the congressional budget process.
The idea of reconciliation was borrowed from the executive branch as a way to finalize
the budget. As designed, reconciliation would be the last step in the process.
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d. Impoundments
Title X of the Act controlled the use of impoundments by a President. It
established deferrals and rescissions of budget authority, which give Congress the upper
hand in the process. If Congress chooses not to act, then the obligation is continued.
Title X ended the stalemate of impoundments.
e. Two Budget Resolutions
The first of the resolutions was designed as a target, while the second was a
ceiling. Section 301 of the first resolution sets forth:
(1) "The appropriate level of total budget outlays and of total new authority.
(2) An estimate of budget outlays and an appropriate level of new budget
authority for each major functional category, for contingencies, and for
undistributed intragovernmental transactions based on allocations of the
appropriate level of total budget outlays and of total new budget authority.
(3) The amount, if any, of the surplus of the deficit in the budget which is
appropriate in light of economic conditions and all other relevant factors.
(4) The recommended level of Federal revenues and the amount, if any, by which
the aggregate level of Federal revenues should be increased or decreased by
bills and resolutions to be reported by the appropriate committees.
(5) The appropriate level of the public debt, and the amount, if any , by which the
statutory limit on the public debt should be increased or decreased by bills and
resolutions to be reported by appropriate committees.
(6) Such other matters relating to the budget as may be appropriate to carry out
the purposes of this Act". {Ref. 4: p. ISO}
The Second resolution affirms or revises, on the basis of new information
and data, changed economic circumstances, and Congress's spending actions, and the
matters contained in the first resolution (that is, the "target" levels of budget authority
and outlays, total revenues, and the public debt limit). {Ref. 7: p. 12}
3. Public Law 93-344 and the Appropriations Committees
The House Appropriation Committee was no longer the guardian of the purse.
After a decade of increased spending, the Appropriation Committees had lost
credibility as the policeman of the budget {Ref. 8: p. 441}. Congress established
controls over the committee in order to monitor the relationship between spending bills
and the budget. Each bill is given a scorecard and closely watched by a member of the
Budget committee. A "crosswalk" is an information link that connects the budget
resolution (national priorities) to the appropriations bills (specific spending issues).
The crosswalks were a way to monitor the spending decisions of the Appropriations
30
Committee. One Democrat who sits on both the Budget and Appropriations
Committee commented about the impact of the new budget process:
Appropriations is still a strong committee but it's nothing like it used to be.
Everybody in the Congress is becoming an expert on spending and they are less
likely to defer to us. It's a whole new ball game with the Budget Committees,
and Appropriations isn't top dog anymore. {Ref. 4: p. 123}
The biggest role change for the Appropriations Committee was the required
submission of Views and Estimates by 15 March. The committee was forced to behave
like a claimant. Section 301(c) of Public Law 93-344 provides for the Views and
Estimates of the committees. All standing committees submit reports to the Budget
Committees indicating their legislative plans for the next year. The Appropriations
Committees were forced to submit higher estimates than were required. The
Appropriations Committees cannot ask for less than they want in subsequent
appropriation bills, nor can they calculate their needs so closely as to risk a possible
breach of the budget targets later in the year. To be safe, they must err on the high
side, even if this means a further weakening of their control over federal expenditures.
{Ref. 8: pp. 442-443}
B. THE BUDGET COMMITTEES
Title I of Public Law 93-344 established two Budget Committees. The
committees were to consist of five members from the Committee on Appropriations,
five members from the Committee on Ways and Means, and 13 members from
Congress as a whole. Each committee was given the following duties:
(1) "To report the matters requires to be reported by it under Title III and IV of
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
(2) To make continuing studies of the effect on budget outlays of relevant existing
and proposed legislation and to report the results of such studies to the House
in a recurring basis.
(3) To request and evaluate continuing studied of tax expenditures, to devise
methods of coordinating tax expenditures, policies and programs with direct
budget outlay, and to report the results of such studies to the House on a
recurring basis.
(4) To review on a continuing basis, the conduct by the Congressional Budget
Office of its functions and duties". {Ref. 4: pp. 174-175}
The Budget Committees were created to guide Congress in the task of setting
national priorities. The Budget Committees overlapped the existing committee
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structure and were designed to provide Congress the coordination that it lacked prior
to the Budget Act.
1. Problems Integrating the committees into Congress
The new guardians had to fit into Congress's framework and establish a niche
for themselves if they were to survive. There three problem areas that would retard the
committees efforts:
(1) budgeting has no unchallenged area of specialization;
(2) the committee must deal with politically dangerous topics;
(3) the nature of budgeting causes a sporadic workload. {Ref. 8: pp. 110-119}
The first area, lack of specialization, gives the committee overlapping interests
with other committees which causes the members to be perceived as meddlers. This is
not the type of committee on which a member normally can establish a career. {Ref. 8:
p. no}
Dealing with politically dangerous topics, such as the size of government and
the trade-off between jobs and inflation, steeps the Budget Committees in controversial
subjects. Most representatives avoid this kind of thankless job. Another politically
dangerous area is the economic predictions. The Budget Committees promulgate the
CBO's yearly economic forecasts. Because the budget is tied to the economy, most
members fear that they must assume responsibility for that year's economic
performance. (Ref. 8: pp. 112-114}
A sporadic workload is caused by the nature of budgeting. Attention is
focused on the Budget Committee for a short period of time. This type of committee
job is nonattention getting and therefore undesirable. The Budget Committee has
attempted to focus attention after the budget cycle is over by issuing "early warning"
reports. However, most of these nonbudget attention getting attempts have failed.
{Ref. 8: p. 115}
2. Potential Rewards for Budgeting
While the negatives to membership on the Budget Committee were great,
there were some rewards. Members of Congress seek membership on committees that
will further their careers. The most popular committee positions are on powerful
committees characterized by integration, autonomy, consensus
,
expertise, orientation
to the parent chamber, and greater influence {Ref. 4: p. 58}. The Budget Committee
did not offer these advantages but it did have the benefit of no seniority. A freshman
representative could impact decision-making because of the structure of the committee.
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This type of committee structure is unusual for Congress, which tends to use the
seniority system for almost every facet of committee operations. Still, most freshmen
viewed the committee as a secondary assignment and would give attendance at other
committee sessions higher priority. (Ref. 4: pp. 78-79}
Other advantages include, no subcommittees and a large staff. Members work
on the whole budget which sets national priorities; they are not divided into little
segments only contributing a small part. When attention is focused on a budget
member, he commands information about the whole picture instead of a snapshot. A
large staff means influence and the Budget Committee requires a large number of
people to police the budget resolutions. Some of the staff work for the members of the
committee personally, while others work in adjacent offices and are basically divorced
from the members. The centralized group or "core" staffs do the policing and detail
work of budgeting. Unlike the core staffs, the members' aides go long periods without
doing much budgeting work. (Ref. 8: p. 119-122}
The biggest reward of the Budget Committee goes to the Chairman of the
committee. He is always in the spotlight. Reporters seek his opinions on the budget
and tend to ignore the other members of the committee. During the first few years of
the new process, the media lavished attention on the two Chairmen, Brock Adams and
Edmund Muskie. They were always available to give personal explanations for why
Congress was regaining control over the federal budget {Ref. 8: p. 126}. The chairmen
can also gain in status because it is the Chairman of the Budget Committee who must
deal with the other Chairmen on issues affecting the resolutions. Because of these
factors the status of the position has grown with each year of the budget process.
3. Interaction of the Budget Committees with Congress from 1975 to 1979
As stated, there was little reward for a place on the Budget Committee for a
member of Congress. Initially, the committee did not establish a niche for itself.
Budgets were growing and the committee did little more than meddle into the business
of the other committees. But times changed, and in 1979 there was a growing
sentiment to balance the budget. Positions on the Budget Committee were sought
because attention was being focused on the budget once again. Budgeting has cycles of
interest and Congressmen know when to position themselves for a piece of the action.
Before the Budget Act, the floor vote signaled to the Appropriations Committees that
it was time to economize. After the Budget Act, it would be the Budget Committee
who would lead Congress's economizing efforts.
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C. LEGISLATIVE SAVINGS
From 1976 to 1979, the Budget Committees attempted to control the purse
strings by using legislative savings. A legislative saving requires action to eliminate or
modify a current law by the Authorizing Committee with jurisdiction (Ref. 7: p. 8}.
These savings were an attempt to reduce the mandated expenditures of laws which had
been passed years before. The Budget Committee would assume legislative savings at
the time of the first budget resolution. These savings were listed in Budget Committee
reports, not in the actual budget resolution. It was then left up to the Authorizing
Committees to change the law. However, the creation of a new law or the
modification of present ones if often a lengthy and cumbersome process. If the
Authorizing Committee did nothing, the assumed savings would be lost. {Ref. 7: p. 9}
During FY 1977, The Budget Committees achieved one of their few legislative
savings. While a total of 3027 million dollars were assumed in the first resolution,
attention centered on the one percent kicker for federal retirees. The one percent
kicker was a law which required an additional payment above the cost of living to
retired federal employees. President Carter's budget suggested the elimination of the
kicker. The Senate's Defense Authorizing Committee eliminated the kicker but the
House's did not. The Senate based their elimination contingent on a similar treatment
for civilian retirees. In conference, the elimination of the kicker was accepted and the
bill became law. This was only the first step, because the Defense Appropriations Bill
funded the kicker. It took floor action by the Chairman of the Budget Committee,
Brock Adams, to stop the funding. This still did not eliminate the kicker because the
Civilian Authorization and Appropriation Bills had to be changed. After much debate
the bills were changed and the one percent kicker was eliminated. That legislative
savings resulted in a 200 million dollar savings for FY 1977. It was the only savings
that year out of the 3027 million initally assumed. {Ref. 7: p. 10}
The one percent kicker was a good example of the problems with legislative
savings. Since the savings were not included in the first resolution, there was no
binding vote on them. Once in a while, an affected committee would seek to reduce
the amount of savings targeted for programs in its jurisdiction, but the typical strategy
was to avoid a floor confrontation on the issue {Ref. 12: p. 53}. During the last year of
legislative savings, FY 1980, the House Budget Committee organized a task force to try
and make the system work. The committee assumed 6 billion dollars in savings and
sent "Dear Colleague" letters to the Authorizing Committee Chairmen to push for the
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changes. The Chairmen responded indicating support for about half of the savings.
Also, the Budget Committee held meetings with the leaders of the House and sent
reports to the Speaker of the House. These efforts resulted in a total savings of 200
million dollars or just 3% of the initial assumption.
Legislative savings failed because of two reasons:
(1) They lacked the force of law.
(2) There wasn't enough time to implement the cumbersome changes after the
second resolution. {Ref. 7: p. 10}
The Budget Committee chose to avoid a jurisdictional battle by not including the
savings in the first resolution. They hoped that, if Congress were to approve the
resolution without tampering with the assumptions, it would be possible later in the
year to push for the necessary legislation on the claim that Congress had endorsed the
savings when it adopted the resolution. {Ref. 12: p. 6}
The lack of time to enact changes points out a problem in the budget process
itself. Once the ceilings of the second resolution were agreed to, committees were
unwilling to reopen appropriation issues that had been decided only weeks earlier or to
take away funds that were about to be spent. This explains the infrequent use of
reconciliation during this period. {Ref. 12: p. 6}
In conclusion, the Budget Committees spoke softly and did not carry a stick.
The new guardians of the purse were initially weak because of the structural and
procedural design of the congressional budget process. In order to effectively control
spending, the Budget Committees would have to change the process in its favor. The
next chapter will explore what the Budget Committees did to change the budget
process and control the purse.
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IV. RECONCILIATION: 1979 TO 1985
The failure of legislative savings pointed toward the need for a budget process
that would bind representatives to savings decisions. This chapter will look at the
triumphs and failures of the reconciliation process.
A. RULES AND SCOPE OF RECONCILIATION
The reconciliation process operates in the legislative environment of the
Congress. There are rules which govern the Congress as a whole and special rules
spelled out in Public Law 93-344 which govern the reconciliation process.
Reconciliation has evolved and will continue to evolve because of its conflict-
generating nature. This section will explain the rules and scope of the process.
1. Rules
The rules for reconciliation are dictated by legislative law. There are set
procedures that Congress should follow, but in reality, the legislative branch rarely
operates strictly according to the rules. Initially, there were rules that prevented adding
nongermane amendments to the reconciliation bill. Congress quickly dispensed with
that formality and began to attach whatever amendments they could to the bill as it
was debated. However, there are some rules that have always been followed. The
basic premise of reconciliation is that the Budget Committees only have jurisdiction of
totals. The other committees decide how the cuts are to be made to the various
programs under their jurisdiction. This does not prevent the Budget Committee from
making suggestions, as they do each year. The rule against the directing of changes
prevents the Budget Committees from upsetting the balance of power. Reconciliation
can only work if the power is shared, and confining the Budget Committees to financial
issues is a means of guarding against excessive concentration of power. {Ref. 12: p. 11}
2. Scope
The reconciliation process can change spending and revenue legislation with a
single bill. Reconciliation instructions have been used to rewrite existing laws under
the normal domain of the authorizing, appropriations and revenue Committees. The
following is an example of a reconciliation instruction from FY 1984:
The House Committee on Veterans' Affairs shall report changes in law within the
jurisdiction of that committee to change spending in amounts sufficient to
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decrease budget authority by S2 16,000,000 and outlays by S2 14,000,000 in fiscal
year 1984; further, the Congress finds that to attain the policy of this resolution
in future fiscal years requires decreases of S235,000,000 in budget authority and
S234,000,000 in outlays in fiscal year 1985; and requires decreases of S24 1,000,000
in budget authoritv and S238,000,000 in outlays in fiscal year 1986. (Ref. 13: p.
19}
The instruction shows the different treatment for the current year and the outyears.
Because spending decisions are hidden in various types of legislation, the
Budget Committees made sure that authorizations were included into the process. This
was no easy task because the Budget Act was designed to prevent authorization
legislation being considered in the first budget resolution. Nevertheless, once Congress
voted to allow authorization legislation to be considered in the reconciliation
instructions, the Budget Committees could control entitlements which are not under
the appropriations process. (Ref. 12: pp. 15-16}
Reconciliation instructions are multiyear in approach. They cover the current
year and the next two outyears. The outyears are targets to prevent the committees
from satisfying the terms but not the intent of an instruction. The 1980 Reconciliation
bill (Public Law 96-499) had a single year scope and many committees made temporary
changes to comply with the terms of the bill. The targets are an attempt to prevent the
committees from writing this type of legislation. {Ref. 12: p. 17}
B. THE RECONCILIATION BILL
In order to save any money a reconciliation bill must be signed by the President.
That action is the end of a long process which started before the first budget resolution
is reported. At that time, the committees of Congress start working on the changes in
law that they expect will be included or want included in the reconciliation instructions.
This is required because of the one month requirement to report legislation after the
first budget resolution. The next step is the reporting of the budget resolution by both
Houses. Each Budget Committee reports reconciliation instructions for the committees
of both Houses because the House and Senate have different committee names and
jurisdictions. After the resolutions are reported, they are debated and amended until
each House agrees on their own version of the budget resolution. Each House must
agree on their own version of the budget resolution. Once the two bodies have voted
favorably for their separate bills, the Budget Committee and other affected committee
representatives meet in conference.
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In conference, the House and Senate iron out differences and decide on one
version of the bill. The bill must be passed without changes in both the House and
Senate in order to be submitted for presidential approval; otherwise, the bill goes back
to conference to once again create a single version of the bill.
C. THE FIRST USE OF RECONCILIATION: FY 1981
The Senate Budget Committee attempted to move the reconciliation process to
the first resolution in FY 1980. The Senate committee felt that binding savings, which
were voted upon by the body of Congress, would realize actual savings. The House
Budget Committee was unwilling to go along with its counterpart and pushed for
legislative savings. As discussed before, the legislative savings process failed and the
House Budget Committee reconsidered the Senate approach. The House Budget
Committee reported the first budget resolution (H.Con.Res 307) for FY 1981 in March
of 1980. The resolution contained reconciliation instructions directing eight House and
eight Senate Authorizing Committees to report legislation saving 9.059 billion in
outlays. Table 3 is a breakdown of assigned savings by House Committees {Ref. 8: p.
18}.
TABLE 3
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Post Office and Civil Service
Veterans Affairs














The committees used section 301(B)(2) of Public Law 93-344 as authority to
move reconciliation to the first resolution. That section provides that the first budget
resolution may require any procedure "which is considered appropriate to carry out the
38
purpose of this Act" {Ref. 4: p. 181}. The committee report addressed the issue of
whether reconciled committees were restricted to specific spending reductions, or
whether the committees had flexibility to pick and choose which programs would be
reduced:
Although the committee may suggest certain specific reforms in maki ng its
reconciliation recommendations, the Authorizing Committees are free to
determine what provisions of law will be changed and how those changes will be
made. The only requirement is that the committee realize the total amount of
savings specified in the reconciliation instruction. (Ref. 7: p. 17}
The Committee Chairmen put up a strong floor fight to prevent the use of
reconciliation in the first budget resolution. The Chairmen argued that reconciliation
instructions were an attack on the committee system itself. They also felt that the
spending committees were in the best position to make spending cuts because they
were most familiar with the priorities within their jurisdictions. The Budget Committee
countered these claims by pointing out the failure of legislative savings the previous
year. The committee also addressed the time constraints involved with generating new
legislation and the flexibility of the Budget Act which envisioned evolution. After the
debate, Republicans and Democrats joined together to vote for the budget resolution
which included reconciliation instructions. That vote gave the Budget Committees a
tool to try and control the purse. {Ref. 7: pp. 17-21}
The largest conference in the history of Congress met to iron out the differences
between the bills. After several months of legislative work, President Carter signed the
bill into law (PL 96-499) on 5 December 1980. The President hailed Congress saying:
There have been times this year . . . when we were doubtful about whether
the budget procedure itself could be preserved. But the Reconciliation Act of
1980 ... is a vivid demonstration of the courage of Congress in dealing with very
difficult questions in exercising budget restraint. {Ref. 14: p. 130}
D. RECONCILIATION: FY1982 TO 1986
1. Different Years - Different Processes
a. FY 1982
As stated before, reconciliation is evolving. In FY 1982, the Reagan
Administration used reconciliation to spearhead the "Reagan revolution". The Senate
included the large package of cuts in its first resolution. The House Budget Committee
ignored the suggested cuts and reported a much smaller reconciliation package. After
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the first resolution was reported, representatives in the House substituted a floor
amendment for the reconciliation instructions reported in the first budget resolution.
Delbert Latta offered the amendment, essentially the same as the President's plan,
which increased the Budget Committees proposed cuts by 20 billion dollars. The Latta
substitute, offered 7 May 1981, caused problems for the committees due to the time
required to achieve change the existing laws. Normally, the committees start work on
the changes in February. The substitution of instructions during debate of the budget
resolution circumvented committee input to the process. Because the process had
never been used at this point in the budget cycle nor involved such a magnitude of
program cuts, there was a great deal of confusion over both procedures and strategies
for affecting the outcomes {Ref. 6: p. 326}. The problems involved with the 1982 use
of reconciliation led to modified reconciliation efforts of successive years in an attempt
to curtail the scope and complexity of the process. (Ref. 7: p. 34}
b. FY 1983
In Fy 1983, six substitutes were offered before the House version of the
budget resolution was rejected by the House. The House passed a new version of the
budget resolution and again substituted a Latta reconciliation package for its text.
After the conference
,
the parts of the reconciliation package were considered
separately on the floor. This differed from the usual single package approach. There
were four bills: H.R. 6782, H.R. 6862, H.R. 6812, and H.R. 6892 in the House. The
Ways and Means Committee did not report out a separate bill and proceeded directly
to conference. Eventually, all of the bills were combined into one bill as the Budget
Act had intended the process to work. FY 1983 was the first year that revenue
increases were a significant part of the reconciliation package. The Ways and Means
Committee played politics and allowed the Senate's Finance Committee to report a
politically unpopular tax increase package. The House had strongly rejected the Ways
and Means Committee's response to the reconciliation instructions. Even though the
Constitution stipulates that revenue legislation must originate in the House, it was an
election year and the democratically controlled House was willing to delegate that
authority. The revenue increase was seen as the first major test of congressional
willingness to comply with reconciliation instructions. It took strong political support




FY 1984 was characterized by disagreement between the House and Senate.
After much debate, the Senate adopted a House version of the reconciliation bill for
that year and it became Public Law 98-270. The savings were small (1.4 billion in
budget authority, 1.828 in outlay), compared to the previous three years. The law was
passed in April of 1984 which just beat out the deadline for consideration.
d. FY 1985
FY 1985 was a confused effort because the bill from the previous fical year
remained unpassed. The House Budget Committee reported reconciliation instructions
that included the last years savings. Once the FY 1984 bill was signed into law,
reconciliation was abandoned for FY 1985. Congress turned its attention to a deficit
reduction plan which differed from the reconciliation process.
e. FY 1986
The 1985 Reconciliation Bill was a large package aimed at reducing the
deficit. There were problems with the process that year because the House passed two
bills (Hr 3128, Hr 3500) which included overlapping and sometimes conflicting
provisions from 14 committees. The conference agreement generated objections and
veto threats because of several controversial elements, not the least of which was the
manufacturers' tax to pay the "superfund" hazardous-waste cleanup program {Ref. 16:
p. 499}. The House and Senate fought over the superfund tax and both eventually
rejected the conference report. All during the debate, President Reagan threatened to
veto the bill because of various taxes designed to raise revenues were included in the
package. FY 1986 marked a decided shift in the focus of reconciliation from program
cuts to revenue increases. The administration, which was known for not increasing
taxes, and various factions in the Congress killed the bill in 1985.
E. RECONCILIATION AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE
Reconciliation gave the Budget Committees the cutting edge. Congress ensured
that it would be able to carry out an overall fiscal policy. In the 50's, Congress was
able to economize by rejecting appropriations bills as they reached the floor. It took
30 years for Congress to reinstitute a process which expressed its will upon the
committees. Even after the Budget Act, Congress continued to show accommodation
to traditional committee interests and budgeting patterns. Reconciliation represents
the first time in budgeting that Congress has really been able to overcome its
decentralized structure and its general pattern of accommodation. {Ref. 6: p. 330}
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Some argue that reconciliation is a shift toward executive control of the
congressional budget. The Reagan Blitz was characterized by Congress substituting
the Budget Committee's plans for the President's wishes. In 1981 the committees did
not have enough time to formulate their own cuts. They used the OMB recommended
cuts to satisfy the reporting requirements. But large cuts and the Reagan Blitz appear
to be over and without popular support, and presidential advocacy of reconciliation
seems to have little effect on Congress.
Critics charge that reconciliation has changed the congressional balance of
power. In some cases, reconciliation can eliminate the normal distinction between the
legislative committees and appropriating committees with one sweeping vote on the
floor. In 1982 Congress legislated in reverse with the body as a whole instructing the
committees on what actions to take. Reconciliation brings the authorizing,
appropriations, and revenue functions under the Budget Committees' purview. The
brief history of reconciliation does mot support the theory that a shift of power has
taken place. The committees can use their positions to cause stalemate and the
prevention of a reconciliation bill from passing.
Some feel that the savings are ambiguous. Tax increases and expenditures cuts
are being packaged together making it difficult to identify the cuts. Often the cuts
themselves are hazy, including such items as management savings, lower interest
payments, and accounting changes {Ref 17: p. 123). It appears that reconciliation cuts
can fall pray to congressional strategies which are designed to avoid hard decision-
making. The next chapter will use data to explore the advantages and disadvantages of
the reconciliation process.
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V. DATA, ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS
This chapter will study different groups of data to try and assess the impact of
reconciliation. Data collected by Fenno in the 1950's will be compared to the
reconcilation data of the 1980's, to compare the budget cutting tools of his time
against the tools of today. Also, the reconciliation data for six years will be evaluated
for any significant trends.
A. CONGRESS AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE
This section examines whether Congress has regained the power of the purse
using reconciliation. Fenno studied the Appropriations Committees in the 1950's and
came to the conclusion that the appropriation process underpinned the relationship
between the Legislative and Executive branches of Government. Fenno quantified the
power by studying the degree to which the Executive branch budget requests were cut.
As discussed before, the appropriation process deteriorated and the cuts became
insignificant. Reconciliation is a new way to control the budget which goes beyond
simple reductions to annual appropriations.
1. Data
Fenno studied the reductions made to 36 bureaus from 1950 to 1962. Table 4
identifies the cuts (in percent) made by the House Appropriations Committee {Ref. 2:
p. 359). Included in Table 4 is an adjustment to Fenno's data based on the percentage
of the budget which came under appropriations review or was controllable. Due to the
unavailability of data, regression analysis was used to project the controllable
percentages from known data taken from the Budget of the United States series. The
two percentages were multiplied together to arrive at an overall budget control
percentage.
Table 5 lists the final reconciliation cuts made during 1980 to 1985. These
figures are the savings for each budget year and do not include the targets of the
outyears. Revenue increases were not included because they are not related to
appropriation type cuts. Budget authority and outlay cuts were summed and compared




APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE CUTS : 1950 TO 1962
Year % of budget % cut % of total budget cut
+ + + + +++++++++++ +++++++ +++++++++++++++++++++
1950 72. 1 6. 2 4. 5
1951 70. 3 5. 3 3. 7
1952 68. 4 6. 4. 1
1953 66. 6 15. 2 10. 1
1954 64. 8 4. 9 3. 2
1955 63. 2. 7 1. 7
1956 61. 1 3. 7 2. 3
1957 59. 3 8. 4. 7
1958 57. 5 0. 5 0. 3
1959 55. 6 0. 4 0. 2
1960 53. 8 1. 2 0. 6
1961 52. 3. 3 1. 7
1962 49. 9 3. 6 1. 8
average cut 3.
TABLE 5




































average cut 2. 6
2. Analysis
During the period that Fenno studied the Appropriations Committees the
average cut was 3.0%. The size of the cuts varied from an 11% cut during an
economy year to an insignificant cut of 0.2% in 1959. The economy year of 1953 was
spurred by a Republican controlled Congress reacting to a Democratic President's
request for programs. The next year the Republican Congress acted with far greater
leniency toward a Republican President (Ref. 2: p. 359}.
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The average reconciliation cut of the budget was 2.6%. The largest cut was
12.8% in 1981 and the smallest was 0% in 1983 and 1985. However, the 1984 data
includes some savings formulated but not passed in 1983. The biggest cut was in 1981
during the Reagan Blitz. The Republican President used a Republican controlled
Senate to make large cuts to the budget.
Table 6 compares the cuts made by the two different processes. The range
and average of the reductions are similar. Even the pattern of the cuts is somewhat
similar; a large cut followed by years of much smaller cuts. In any case, the results of
the two very different processes reveals that Congress wants the ability to make
significant reductions to the total budget when there is an economy mood in the
country.
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF BUDGET CUTTING PROCESSES
APPROPRIATIONS RECONCILIATION
YEAR % CUT YEAR( FY
)
%CUT
+ + + + +++++ ++++ + + + +
1950 4. 5 1981 1. 3
1951 5. 3 1982 12. 8
1952 4. 1 1983 1. 3
1953 10. 1 1984 0.
1954 3.2 1985 0. 4








AVE 3. 2. 6
3. Conclusion
Congress reestablished a system that could cut a significant portion from the
overall budget. Fenno concluded that the House Appropriations Committee controlled
the power of the purse by reducing Presidential budget requests an average of 3%. It
appears that, based on statistical analysis of reconciliation, Congress has regained the
power of the purse. During an economy year, Congress can instruct the committees to
cut spending for the current year and programmed spending from previous years.
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Reconciliation cuts go beyond the scope of the appropriations process and cut the
Authorizing Committees' spending ability.
On the other hand, 1983 and 1985 point out a potential problem area that
Congress faces using the reconciliation process to control the budget. Congress can
choose not to pass a reconciliation bill and the savings are lost. The conflict
generating aspects of the reconciliation process might create the potential for more
years with zero cuts.
B. THE POWER OF THE PURSE WITHIN CONGRESS
When Fenno studied the appropriation system, He reported that within Congress
the House led the way in budget cutting decisions. The Senate decreased the average
cut made by the House Committee by 3.2% {Ref. 2: p. 586}. The Senate had different
norms and attitudes toward budget cutting than its counterpart in the House. Fenno
described the House's perception of the Senate as "a mutual admiration society," or a
"a small body where trading is easy" {Ref. 2: p. 627}. The Senators were careful not to
step on anyone's toes and rarely openly criticized each other's pet projects. This
section will examine whether the pattern described in Fenno's time has changed.
1. Data
The data presented in Table 7 is the initial instructions contained in the first
budget resolutions of the House and Senate and is only the total for that budget year.
Outyears have not been included. The data was obtained from House and Senate
reports which accompany that year's resolution. The Budget Committees include
reconciliation instructions in the first budget resolution each year. These instructions
are not binding until the respective House approves their resolution. Therefore, the
data presented is the Budget Committees's suggested cuts based on the other
committees of Congress inputs. These suggested reductions to the budget are similar
to the Appropriations Committees' decisions in Fenno's time. The data includes
instructions from FY 1980. As stated before, the Senate included reconciliation
instructions in their first budget resolution but the House continued to rely on
legislative savings.
2. Analysis
Based on the data in Table 7, the Senate Budget Committee proposes larger
cuts than the House Budget Committee (except for 1985, when the Senate Committee
did not include reconciliation instructions in the first resolution because the




YEAR HOUSE INSTRUCTIONS SENATE INSTRUCTIONS
FY B. A. OUTLAYS B. A. OUTLAYS
1980 3500 4000
1981 4240 5744 4652 6558
1982 13052 15823 52825 36945
1983 4184 3703 9504
1984 1751 2189 1842 3121
1985 1200 2350 1200 2350
1986 7680 14740 22069 29903
TOTAL 27923 45030 89791 92381
size, are common. The big difference in FY 1981 represents the different pattern of
adoption of the Reagan proposed budget cuts. The House substituted the Reagan plan
after the reporting of the first resolution, while the the Senate immediately
incorporated the cuts into the their resolution and then reported it. Even with FY
1982 removed from the data set, the Senate would still have proposed an extra 24
billion dollars in cuts to outlays.
Before 1981, both Budget Committees had Democratic leadership, while after
1981, the Republicans controlled the Chairmanship of the Senate committee. The data
does not support any change of budgeting patterns after the Republicans took over.
3. Conclusions
The evidence presented in Table 7 suggests that the Senate Budget Committee
guards this nation's purse. The Senate consistently proposes larger cuts to the budget.
The difference in party control of the Budget Committees does not account for the
apparent shift in norms since Fenno's time. The Senate proposed larger cuts even
when it was Democratically controlled. If the Budget Committees are the new
guardians of the purse, then the norms of budgeting which were true in the 1950's are
no longer applicable today. The evidence suggests that the Senate is no longer "the
court of last appeal", and that the House has relinquished its claim on the power of the
purse to the Senate.
C. CONGRESS AND RECONCILIATION INSTRUCTIONS: FY 1981
Each year the Budget Committee issues reconciliation instruction once Congress
approves the savings, the committees should follow through to achieve the desired
47
results. By passing the first resolution, the Congress established a legislative law which,
in theory, binds the committees instructed to carry out the provisions of that law. This
section will trace the flow of instructions in the House from the initial reporting of the
first budget resolution to the final bill.
1. Data
The Budget Committee reported the FY 1981 First Budget Resolution which
contained the reconciliation instructions previously discussed in Chapter IV. A total of
nine committees were directed to report legislation saving 6.925 billion in budget
authority, 9.059 billion in outlays, and increasing revenues 22.2 billion. The data was
adjusted for double counting between the Armed Services Committee and the Post
Office and Civil Services Committee.
Input from Committee Chairmen and general politicking smoothed the initial
assumptions before they were reported in the House Budget Resolution. Table 8
presents the changes and the percentage increase or decrease for each committee.
There is nothing to bind Congress to the totals at this point in the budget process, so
changes were made to the initial assumptions.
The data is presented for each House committee that was given an instruction.
The inital instructions are compared to the changes made before the budget resolution
was passed. The column on the right maintains a record of the increases or decreases
to the totals.
The House passed the resolution on 7 May 1980. Table 9 shows the various
changes that were made to the reconcilation instructions.
At this point the budget resolution is open for Congress to examine the
priorities contained within the document. In FY 1981, there were two budget
resolutions; the first was intended as a target and the second as a ceiling.
Representatives sometimes force the amendment of the resolution before it can be
passed by a majority. These amendments can create new reconciliation requirements
that were not envisioned by the Budget Committees, such as the 800 million dollar cut
in budget authority to the Small Business Committee. Once passed, the House has
made an agreement with itself to carry out the provisions of the budget resolution.
Once the Senate passed their version of the budget resolution, the
reconciliation package was separated from the budget resolution. The two Houses met
in conference to agree on one version of the FY 1981 Reconciliation Bill. Once the
compromise was agreed to, it had to be passed by both Houses of Congress. During
4S
TABLE 8
CHANGES TO HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE'S INITIAL
ASSUMPTIONS
(in millions of dollars)
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TOTAL 6925 4950 29 decrease
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TOTAL 9059 6400 30 decrease












the conference, reconciliation requirements were created, increased, decreased, or
unchanged. Table 10 tracks the difference between the House passed resolution and
the conference agreement on the Fy 1981 Reconciliation Bill.
President Carter signed the bill into law on 5 December 1980.
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TABLE 9
CHANGES TO THE INITIAL RESOLUTION ASSUMPTION
(in millions of dollars)
















































































































Finally, Table 1 1 summarizes the flow of changes from the initial assumptions
to the final bill. It captures the total change to a committee's required cuts which is
sometimes lost when compared at each step.
2. Analysis
In FY 1981, the biggest changes to the reconciliation instructions came at the
beginning and the end of the process. Overall, the final cuts were about 50% of the
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TABLE 10
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1461 149 90 decrease
-4 82 created
544 429 21 decrease
375 487 30 increase
300 305 02 increase











2336 417 82 decrease
349 1100 215 increase
619 463 25 decrease
375 493 31 increase
760 732 04 decrease
705 826 17 increase
no change
no change
600 600 no change
5744 4631 20 decrease














initially proposed cuts and the proposed revenue increases were reduced 83%. While
some committees' instructions did increase, the general trend was downward. The
Ways and Means Committee managed to avoid the majority of its instructed cuts and
revenue increases by the end of the process. Other successful avoiders include: the
Armed Services Committee, the Agriculture Committee, and the Post Office Civil
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TABLE 11
THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE'S INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS
COMPARED TO THE FINAL RECONCILIATION BILL
(in millions of dollars)





WAYS + MEANS 717 149 80 decrease
COMMERCE 200 82 59 decrease
P. 0. + CIV SER 2238 429 81 decrease
VET AFFAIRS 400 487 21 increase
P.W. + TRANS 150 305 103 increase
ED + LABOR 839 840 no change
iminatedAGRICULTURE 520 el
ARMED SERVICE 1861 el iminated
SMALL BUSINESS 800 created



















































TOTAL 22200 3645 84 decrease
Service Committee. The cuts to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and the Public
Works and Transportation were increased as the process proceeded. Only the changes
to the Education and Labor Committee remained relatively stable.
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3. Conclusions
The Budget Committee's proposed reconciliation savings had the least effect
on the powerful Ways and Means Committee. It appears that even when Congress
writes legislative laws to force action, some committees can use their influential
positions and avoid making the cuts.
The overall 50% compliance with the reconciliation process represents a
significant improvement over the legislative savings process. Typical legislative savings
were only 3% or less of the assumed savings.
D. THE FLOW OF INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH THE SENATE: FY 1984
For the purpose of comparison to FY 1981, the flow of reconciliation
instructions through the Senate will be examined. FY 1984 was a modified attempt at
reconciliation compared to FY 1981 and FY 1982. The initial instructions contained in
the Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) were about half the magnitude of FY 1981.
Also, the savings which were passed in April of 1984 were much smaller than the
previous efforts.
1. Data
The Senate Budget Committee reported a modest reconciliation effort aimed
at five Senate committees and eight House committees. The first columns in Table 12
lists the savings contained in the Senate's FY 1984 First Budget Resolution.
The second column lists the compromise reached in conference. The third column
compares the two and provides a percentage evaluation of the changes to the
resolutions. The revenues instruction is aimed at the House Ways and Means
Committee. The committees listed are in terms of the Senate's Committee structure.
The total budget authority instruction is 1842 million dollars and the outlay total is
3121 million dollars. Initially, both the House and Senate wanted the Ways and Means
Committee to raise revenues by about 30 billion dollars. After the conference, the
revenue instruction was pared down to 12 billion dollars. The Senate Budget
Committee was unable to push the conference agreement through the Senate. The
Senate adopted a House version of the reconciliation bill which was essentially the
House's position on reconciliation prior to the conference.
Table 13 evaluates the difference between the conference agreement and the










CHANGES TO THE SENATE'S RESOLUTION
(in millions of dollars)
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CHANGES TO REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS




TOTAL 30200 12000 60 decrease
The information was collected from both the Senate's and House's reports which
accompany the different bills. The final bill contained totals of 1400 and 1828 million
dollars for budget authority and outlay. The revenue instruction was eliminated.
Table 14 summarizes the change from the instructions contained in S.C.R. 27
and the final bill as signed by the President.
There was a 24% reduction to budget authority and a 41% decrease in
outlays. The revenue instruction was reduced 30.2 billion dollars and eliminated. It
should be noted that the Agriculture Committee's initial instruction was based on the
elimination of milk price supports which was considered unrealistic at the time.
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TABLE 13
CHANGES TO THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT
( in mi llions of doll.ars)


























TOTAL 1986 1400 29 decrease


























TOTAL 2813 1828 35 decrease











FY 1984 was very different from FY 1981. First of all, the initial effort was
one half the size of the first attempt. Second, there were substantial changes made to
conference agreement before the President finally signed the bill. Third, there was a
breakdown between the efforts of the House and Senate to push the compromise bill
through each House. There was very little difference between the two Budget
Committees' versions of the reconciliation instructions. The totals in Table 12 shows
only a slight change in both Budget Authority and Outlays, but there was significant
changes to the individual committee's requirements. The Agriculture Committee's
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TABLE 14
CHANGES FROM THE RESOLUTION TO THE FINAL BILL
















































534 1334 150 increase
287 288 no change
201 206 3 increase
3121 1828 41 decrease
CHANGES TO REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS
S. C. R. FINAL %(Apr) BILL CHANGE
(Apr)
TOTAL 30200 eliminated
instructions were reduced by about the same amount that the Government Affairs
Committee's requirements were increased. Once again, the Ways and Means
Committee's revenue instructions were dropped dramatically. This time, the reduction
was over 18 billion dollars.
The information in Table 13 contains another instance of where the Ways and
Means Committee managed to eliminate its requirement to report revenue increases
and outlay reductions. The Senate Finance Committee is the Senate's equivalent to
the House Ways and Means Committee. The 400 million requirement for those
committees was the only instruction which was eliminated in the final bill.
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The data in Table 14 shows a similar pattern to the information which was
contained in the summary Table 11 from FY 1981. There is a strong downward trend
with almost all of the initial requirements being reduced. The best avoiders were the
Agriculture Committees and the Ways and Means Committee. Revenues increases
were either scaled down or eliminated.
3. Conclusions
The conflict generating aspects of reconciliation stopped the FY 1984 process
from being completed on time. Even though the totals were small compared to
previous efforts, there was so much disagreement that the bill wasn't signed until April
of the next year. The Budget Committees were unable to get the compromise
conference agreement passed. By FY 1984, Congressional support of the reconciliation
process had begun to fade. Probably the one piece of data that ties FY 1981 and FY
1984 together is the Ways and Means Committee's ability to avoid having to write
reconciliation legislation. It appears that the Budget Committees have become
powerful committees in Congress and have established a niche for themselves, but they
are not stronger than the Ways and Means Committee and seem to have little control
over that committee.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The reconciliation process is a major improvement to the Congressional
budgeting process. It provides the Congress with a mechanism to reduce programmed
spending. The Budget Committees established themselves as the new guardians of the
purse. But it is clear that the new guardians have stronger positions over only some of
the committees. There is lots of room for political maneuvering within the
reconciliation process. One of the clearest cases of that kind of political positioning
happened in FY 1985, when the Ways and Means Committee allowed the Senate to
report revenue legislation. The papers and other reports considered that act to be the
first test of the committee's willingness to comply with the reconciliation instructions.
However, it is clear that those reports were only political rhetoric because the
committees were only following the instructions about half the time and the powerful
Ways and Means Committee almost never complied with the instructions. However, it
should be pointed out that the Reagan Administration generally did not approve of
any kind of tax legislation, but probably would have approved of revenue increases tied
to a reconciliation package as he did in Fy 1985.
57
Reconciliation has worked in the past and could continue to work in the future.
Currently, budgeting in the U.S. is in a state of turmoil and reconciliation is part of the
conflict. There is an ideological gap between the Congress and the President that is
preventing budgets from being passed, never mind budget cutting legislation. The
future of leconciliation may depend on a closer alignment of the Congress and the
President with respect to budget cutting goals.
It is clear that reconciliation has given Congress the tool to control the
Government's purse strings. The question remains whether Congress will use that tool
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